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Unfortunately, White-Collar Is the Default
Setting: Boys and Higher Education
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGELt
At first, the error seemed random. Though not a
member of the wedding party, as an out-of-town visitor I
had been invited to the rehearsal dinner and had asked the
groom what he wanted to do after his college graduation,
some six months hence. His response was, "Oh, I'd like to go
someplace where I can snowboard in winter and wakeboard
in summer." A "where" answer to a "what" question, but
given the occasion, some lack of mental acuity might be
excused. Moreover, four of the six groomsmen he was
hanging with were high school or college boarding buddies
and these guys were showing a certain amount of embar-
rassed reticence when it came to getting to know the
bridesmaids. This was not a time where intellectual
prowess was likely to be on display.
One might have thought that these young men's
embarrassment was a matter of coming to a party
inappropriately dressed, except that it was the adults over
forty of both sexes who were out of place in their suits and
fancy dresses. Almost all of the wedding party was dressed,
not fashionably scruffy, or dirty, but in cotton pants and
wrinkled shirts or tops. And some of the men wore those
funny knit hats that young boarders like to wear, variations
on the bright Chilean hats with the flaps that dangle like
the ears on a basset hound that once were a statement
about solidarity with the campesinos. The embarrassment I
saw was surely not about an aspect of dress, but rather was
t This essay is for Steve, who has taught me to be interested in things that I
never would have seen, but for his help. Thanks for assistance also goes to Alan,
Marc, Tom, David, Mark, Rebecca, Stewart, David, John, Alan, Bert, and many
of the backbenchers in my classes over the years. Laura tried to keep me from
Grievous Error; David's experience elsewhere and sensible analysis helped
clean out some cobwebs. Catherine and Neil provided substantive comments




more closely related to the embarrassment of boys at a
junior high dance who knew what they were supposed to do,
but had not yet decided whether that was what they
wanted to do.
However, the next evening when I examined the line of
groomsmen arrayed, squadron-like, in the front of the
church waiting for the bridesmaids to walk down the aisle,
the groom's error the night before made more sense. Collars
were loose and ties even looser; short hair looked
remarkably like the ski hats had come off not five minutes
before. I doubt that clothes make the man, but it briefly
occurred to me that these were not young men who quite
soon would be productive citizens out in the world getting
and spending and saving for the purchase of a house.
Rather, it was as if some wannabe high school boy band had
been pulled out of rehearsal, hung with-there was no
question of fitted for-tuxedos and pushed into service as
emergency substitutes for a planeload of real groomsmen
trapped at some far off airport in a dense and unyielding
fog. What seemed to me to be the groom's mistake was
anything but. For the young men at this wedding, by birth
tolerably affluent members of the middle class,' where they
lived, and so what they might do for recreation in their
supposed free time, was far more important than what they
might do to earn a living.
As I tried to make sense of my experience of these
young men, I was struck by the fact that the bridesmaids,
admittedly all about two years older than the groomsmen,
as was the bride than the groom, were all in perfectly
ordinary middle-class jobs-teacher, social worker,
paraprofessional or cubicle warrior of one sort or another-
all entry level pieces of the world of white-collar work. They
may have met their "significant others," as the bride had
met the groom, wakeboarding on some lake, or perhaps
snowboarding at some resort, but their recreational
activities did not anchor their identity. These women were
1. I suppose that some people will be uncomfortable with this and many of
the following casual references to, and implicit understandings of, the markers
of social class in America. For me to help such readers would require the
transformation of this essay into a piece of sociology, not something I am
interested in doing. My only defense for this laziness is that I am a bred in the
bone mid-western populist and so for me the fine gradations of social class are
as real, but ineffable, as colors of white snow to Native Alaskans.
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not going to have the problem of figuring out what they
were going to do with their lives when a ruptured ACL or
some other physical injury made it impossible to snowboard
or downhill mountain bike or play basketball.
Later, I was taken with the unexpected resonance of my
observations about the lives of these young men and women
with the story told in a very recent book about children of a
different social class by my friend, Lois Weis. In this book,
Weis writes about a group of now young adults from lower-
middle/upper-working-class, union labor families whom she
had interviewed fifteen years earlier when these officially
designated "honors track" students neared the end of high
school. She reinterviewed as many of these individuals as
she could in order to learn what had happened in their lives
after they had confronted the world of full-time employment
for up to fifteen years. Class Reunion reports her findings,
which provide a disturbing parallel to my experience at the
wedding.
The women that Weis had interviewed for a second
time had pushed forward with some variety of post-
secondary education, not always immediately or linearly,
but almost always eventually. They had created for
themselves settled lives, sometimes no more comfortable
than their parents', sometimes significantly more comfort-
able. The men, on the other hand, could be understood to
have divided themselves into two groups. The smaller group
had done what their female classmates had done, pursued
post-secondary education and fashioned settled, generally
white-collar, sometimes even professional, lives. However,
the larger group had no more than incidentally pursued
further education or other career advancement. Instead,
they had worked a series of random jobs, were anything but
settled and seemed somehow to have gotten stuck doing the
same things that had absorbed them in high school. They
had drifted down the ladder of social class at least one rung.
Yet, like the groom and his groomsmen, they had come to be
identified with their leisure-time activities-hanging out
with the guys, drinking, working on cars, watching TV, and
playing video games.
Now, I do not wish to suggest that the young men I met
at this wedding in the rural Northwest are destined to slide
down the social ladder a rung or two from the level at which
their parents had fashioned a life. I am not so foolish as to
believe that I can predict their future, any more than I
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believe that Lois Weis' young men, so hopeful when nearing
high school graduation, could never have climbed that
ladder, or at least maintained their parents' tenuous hold
on middle-class membership. Nor do I wish to tell another
alcohol-drenched story about failed male identity
formation-the working-class kid who never moves beyond
the thrill of being the high school quarterback, even while
building a respectable life as a mechanic or an oil field
wrangler, or the upper-class twit who never gets past the
success of rowing crew at Harvard, even when working as
an investment banker. Rather, what fascinates and
troubles me is the disconnect between the educational
future that both groups of young men were served up as
they left high school and the world of work that they were
simultaneously presented with. There seems to be a certain
misfit between the academic enterprise that each group was
being funneled into and the future that each could imagine,
such that, in the end, each would be identified with its
leisure-time activities and not with either jobs or
educational attainments.
What then accounts for this misfit between higher
education and the needs and interests of young men in two
disparate social classes? Start with some educational trends
that tend to document the misfit. For over one hundred
twenty years America's high schools have graduated more
female than male students. Nevertheless, for most of these
years, male college graduates far exceeded female. As the
lingering effects of generations of educational gender
discrimination began to be attenuated, initially as a result
of the efforts of participants in the Women's Movement and
later amplified as its goals became written into law, this
historic relationship began to shift. In the mid-Seventies,
male high school dropouts began to exceed females and
there occurred an enormous shift among the recipients of
associate's degrees from more males to more females. By
the mid-Eighties this shift had extended to both bachelor's
and master's degree recipients. To date the disparity
between male and female doctorate and professional degree
recipients has narrowed-law school enrollment is just shy
of being even-but it has not yet turned in favor of females.
The relative decline in male enrollment in higher
education occurred at about the same time as significant
changes in the structure of the American economy. I doubt
that this is a coincidence. Acting on my suspicion, I shall
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continue this inquiry first by looking at the history that
shaped the economy served up to male high school
graduates of two different social classes, then by discussing
the system of higher education that each group confronted,
and finally by exploring some cultural and educational
factors that might complicate the relationship between an
economy and higher education. However, before doing so, it
is important to offer two caveats. I have no illusions that
my ruminations explain the lives of all young males of these
social classes, though for convenience I may seem to speak
as if that is the case. Nor do I believe that the cognitive
preferences or social roles that I choose to examine are
shared by all males or are absent in all females. I simply
wish to try to make a bit more understandable an anything
but hard-edged aspect of our social surround that I find
interesting.2
Let me then start with the story of change in the
American economy since World War II. In the postwar
years, the isolation of our economy from what remained of
the economies of Europe and Asia allowed us to forge what
Verlyn Klinkenborg called, "The Last Fine Time." We took
the industrial manufacturing economy of the pre-war and
wartime worlds, an economy built on the idea that large
groups of men (and some women) would mass-produce both
the inputs of the manufacturing process-coal, copper,
grain, steel, timber, and the like-as well as its final
products-autos, cereals, machines, and even the products
of a nascent consumer economy such as TVs and hi-fi's. This
economy allowed unionized workers in those industries the
ability to obtain relatively high wages, supported their
desire for a middle-class standard of living with cheap
mortgage credit and an expanded road grid, and provided
increased educational opportunities for their children. The
combination of high wages and high prices allowed urban,
white workers, to feel that they had made it. And then "it"
fell apart.
2. In so doing I am attempting to avoid comparisons based on differences
between males and females, or men and women, lest I be accused of all sorts of
essentialism on the one hand, or on the other of failing to recognize the various
racial or ethnic variations about which I cannot know or even the separate
impact of sexual orientation as a differentiating factor in my story. I soldier on,
concentrating on men, and white men at that, because I am perfectly happy
with whatever partial understanding I can wrestle out of my limited
perspective. After all, that is the position of each of us.
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After the European and Japanese economies recovered
from the damage that losing a war had inflicted upon them,
and became seriously competitive with our own, we
attempted to maintain the postwar economy of fullness.
Doing so was difficult. First, the development of
containerization had significantly cut effective ocean freight
rates, bringing downward pressure on the price of goods, as
well as on wages. Second, protecting the domestic market
from such pressure, would have required abandonment of a
commitment to freer trade that was doubly ideological: it
separated us from those evil Communist governments, and
was also designed to discourage a renewal of European
military rivalry by integrating Western European econo-
mies. Third, the growth of the interstate highway system
lowered the cost of national transport, which made it easier
for firms to cut costs by moving to Sunbelt states where
wages were lower and union labor was either actively
discouraged or barely tolerated. So, in a dance of two steps
back, one step forward, we slowly allowed unionized, mass-
production jobs to wither.
The nationwide contraction of the mining, primary
metals, heavy manufacturing and consumer goods
industries-especially electronics, textiles, and garments-
occupied the public press for twenty-five or more years,
starting in the late-Sixties and early-Seventies. These years
saw the destruction of working lives, and so of family
aspirations and communities, in many areas of the country,
but most concentratedly in the industrial Northeast and
Great Lakes. It was in the early, most bewildering part of
these years that Lois Weis' interviewees were born and in
the later, more dismal aftermath when they were graduated
from high school and sought to create adult lives.
Now, of course, the years that Weis' students first
experienced vicariously, as children who clearly felt the
hurt experienced by their parents, and then more directly,
were not only those of destruction. By the mid-Eighties,
when these students were graduated from high school, one
could see a new economy being created, an Impatient
Economy. Leaner staffed and inventoried manufacturing,
financial, consumer and business services, health care
delivery and products, especially pharmaceuticals, and
higher education were all growth industries. But except for
lean manufacturing, primarily located in areas of the
country where residents had little history of such industrial
[Vol. 531040
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employment, all of these growth industries required
educational attainments beyond high school-at least an
associate's degree, more often a college diploma, or even a
master's or professional degree. This is the world that was
served up to both Weis' young men and my groomsmen, a
world that neither group of males seems particularly
attracted to.
One can argue endlessly over whether the educational
qualifications established for the expanding world of white-
collar jobs were really necessary or only artificial barriers
designed to move the cost of training from employers to
employees, or to foster racial discrimination, or to restrict
entry to the wealthier segments of the populace. Resolution
of such debates is both unnecessary for present purposes, as
well as rendered complicated by the modest "dumbing
down" of the content of a college education that followed a
similar change in primary and secondary education. But,
for whatever combination of reasons, post-secondary
education was required of a larger segment of the populace
than ever before and its lack almost guaranteed that
enjoyment of a middle-class lifestyle was impossible, at
least without creating a two-wage-earner family, and often
even for such a family.
This story of a change in economic institutions needs to
be matched with that of a change in the role of our
institutions of higher education. Eighteenth Century
colleges largely prepared upper-class individuals, most
often second sons, for the ministry. In the Nineteenth
Century, the social class of college students gradually
expanded to include members of the upper-middle and even
middle class once the growth of public high schools meant
that more individuals were prepared for further study.
Schools of agriculture, education, engineering, and mines,
often founded in the last third of the century with Morrill
Act monies, seem to have been designed for the more
vocational education that middle-class families were
thought to demand. The more general arts and sciences
education that centered most campuses seems to have been
directed toward the upper-middle and upper-class students,
though it should be remembered that even at the end of the
century it was not unusual for such students to skip part or
all of college, as it offered a curriculum that still had the
trappings of the classical education provided for future
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ministers a century earlier, and instead enter the family
business without securing a degree.
At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, earning a
high school diploma still was not a common occurrence for
American adolescents. Indeed, such an accomplishment was
so tied to membership in the middle and upper-middle class
that three out of four high school graduates entered college,
a percentage never since reached, though only one in four of
them, mostly male, completed a degree. However, as
compulsory school attendance laws extended mandatory
attendance into the early years of high school, graduation
rates increased more than college matriculation rates. For
many of the students who completed high school, part of the
attraction was the existence of serious vocational training-
various shop programs for boys and secretarial services for
girls.
After World War II, the GI Bill increased college
enrollment, though by no means as extensively as memory
would have it. Then, the appearance of the Baby Boom
generation first increased the size of primary and secondary
education in suburban areas, and thereafter in the colleges.
Only at this time does the rate of high school graduates
seeking post-secondary education begin to increase toward
the sixty plus percent that is common today.
Simultaneously, the translation of unionized factory
workers into something approximating middle-class status
reduced the support for vocational education at the same
time that the launch of the Russian satellite, Sputnik, and
so the birth of the great "missile gap," led to development of
honors tracks that pushed more students toward relatively
elite college education. The education of students not
"suited" for that track was diluted, both in content, with an
increased emphasis on skills for living rather than for work,
and in difficulty. As throughput was increased, vocational
education migrated into the junior, now called, community,
colleges and the for-profit "technical institutes." Then,
rather soon, secretarial jobs disappeared as computers
began to reduce clerical and typing burdens, and factory
jobs as well, but not the drive of newly middle-class families
to see their children go to college, the way that seemed to
guarantee continued middle-class status.
College was an odd bargain for the children of
unionized factory labor. Indeed, by the Eighties it was an
odd bargain for the children of white-collar workers as
1042 [Vol. 53
BOYS AND HIGHER EDUCATION
well,3 unaccountably considered the traditional occupants of
college classes. During the first half of the Twentieth
Century, when a majority of college students were either
upper or upper-middle class, how one did in college did not
matter much. These were the years of the Gentleman's C,
at least in places other than City College. Not working very
hard was no big deal. Dad's connections would eventually
lead to a job. And it was just as well, for the curriculum in
the arts and sciences prepared one mostly for participation
in upper- or upper-middle-class society. After all, it still
covered a list of subjects that had not changed in several
generations, except for the addition of a bit of a mostly
generalized social science. So, this curriculum was like the
study of Greek at Oxford, not very useful, even for a job in
the British Civil Service, an entity that, even in the Forties,
was serenely devoted to merit described as "where you went
to school." Higher education was still a mark of social
distinction and important as such.
For middle-class boys, agriculture, engineering, or
(eventually) commerce might provide an alternative, just as
state normal schools provided an alternative for middle-
class girls who wanted to be teachers, but such activities
were clearly a d~class6 sidelight to the main event for
upper- and upper-middle-class students-high jinks and
acceptable grades. None of these students were called
slackers, but the attitude toward education was quite
similar. Doing well was fine, but only if one did not have to
work very hard to do so.
On the other side of World War II, college became a
more serious enterprise. It didn't happen all at once;
evidence, if any is needed, is the late-Sixties and early-
Seventies in colleges around the country. That was an
extended period of high jinks, though admittedly less tied to
fraternity life than would have been the case before the
War. But by the early-Eighties, the end of the Great
Inflation that gripped this country for almost fifteen years,
3. Some readers may find it odd that I make no attempt to differentiate the
reaction of postwar students to college by generational labels-Bobby Soxers,
Boomers, Generation Xers, Millennials, etc. While for certain purposes such
distinctions make sense, when dealing with higher education and the economy
they do not. There is only one relevant distinction: whether one came of age
before or after the Associationalist Economy started to turn into the Impatient
Economy, roughly the mid-Seventies.
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the change was clear. Gaining or maintaining middle-class
status depended on doing well enough in a college that
those employers who offered jobs, as students today say,"with benefits," would look favorably at a resume. The
curriculum had not changed much from that offered before
World War II. Oh yes, there were new majors-criminal
justice, women's studies, various ethnic studies-and some
older ones were newly invigorated--communications/
journalism is the most obvious example-but the core of the
disciplines remained untouched. Fewer students may have
cared for what the departments were offering, but protect-
ing one's grade point average became a major occupation for
college students in a way that it had not been before. Film
titles are instructive. Animal House, that great send-up of
college in the Sixties, turned into Reality Bites, a world of
"have a degree and nowhere I'd ever want to go."
In the disagreement, fight is too strong a word, between
parents, wanting both a degree and a job for their tuition
dollar, and the universities, wanting to be insulated from
parental pressure, it would seem that both had a strong
argument. Large positive numbers of dollars were being
asked from parents for the hope of establishing a child's
class status, proportionately larger than even twenty years
before, especially at public schools where the state contribu-
tion toward tuition has decreased dramatically over the
past twenty years. More than a lick and a promise directed
toward delivering employment related skills was surely not
too much to ask.
At the same time, the universities were not foolish in
suggesting that an arts and sciences education was the best
possible hedge against the likelihood that any package of
skills delivered upon graduation would turn out to be either
the wrong one or wildly outmoded within ten years. Indeed,
it was not clear that any skills, other than the ability to
read and write, together with the ability to dress vaguely
appropriately and be polite, were necessary for most entry-
level white-collar jobs. And the drive to keep costs low,
grade points high and grader discretion at a minimum led
to the minimal achievement by college grads in reading and
writing that employers constantly complained about.
For any student who understood the positions of both
parents and universities, there were many reasons to object
to attending a four-year college. Such institutions, even
more than comprehensive universities, needed to guarantee
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degree completion, but were left with students in the
middle of the distribution of the high school class. A
rigorous, weed-out-the-weak approach to education was not
likely to attract parents' tuition dollars. And in any case, for
a two-wage-earner, middle-class family barely hanging on,
the simple cost of tuition, not to mention room and board,
meant that most students needed part-time employment to
make ends meet. In such circumstances, it would have been
foolish for schools to believe that they could target a
program's difficulty based on the assumption that nomi-
nally full-time students were really full-time students. A
downshifting in the rigor of the curriculum was inevitable.
The two-year schools faced a similar set of problems.
What might be offered? Job training. Remedial reading and
writing could be tied to student-financed, on-the-job
training in the various branches of health care (humans
and other animals), as well as the various clerical jobs. That
might take care of a certain amount of assumedly female
preferences. But what of the male students, the ones who
when I went to high school were euphemistically referred to
as "liking to work with their hands?" Well, there were jobs
in the building trades, though union pressure, continuous
for over a hundred years, kept such programs from
expanding. Other available programs were really quite
technical, having to do with computer systems, printing and
chemical technologies, computer-aided design, and the like.
None of them were even vaguely similar to the assembly
line work that had once supported the working class. The
class work was pretty much like that in high school and
even the lab-like work, quite tedious. Why would such
education be attractive to the male students, however
"bright," who had not found high school to their liking?
Exploration of the range of cultural and educational
factors that tend to complicate the relationship between the
Impatient Economy and higher education lends itself less to
a narrative structure than to a topical one. However, before
switching structure, it is important to bring to mind the
ways that Weis' young men and my almost college gradu-
ates differentially experienced the possibility of post-
secondary education. Social class clearly mattered. College
worked fine for those of Weis' males for whom it could
provide a way out of an existing social class position but
seems to have had little impact on my boarders for whom it
was but a marker of continued membership in the various
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parts of the middle class. And it held faint attraction for
those of Weis' males who, though faced with the
disappearance of the reasonably well-paying, union labor,
factory jobs that their parents had had, experienced the
prospect of leaving their social class position as somehow
not imaginable or at least for whom leaving that position
via further schooling was not psychologically, or education-
ally possible. Thus, it would seem that the education
demanded for success in the Impatient Economy was
palatable to a particular sub-set of those male individuals
for whom it is claimed to be a benefit as a shift in that
economy has changed higher education-outside of the
higher vocational school-from being a mark of social class,
and so of education for participation in that class, to being a
prerequisite for entry into a social class defined, as always,
by a combination of income and kind of work.
I wish to start my exploration of the factors that tend to
complicate the relationship between higher education and
the Impatient Economy with the possibility that the
differential attractiveness of higher education might be
related to preferences for, and so styles of, cognition. There
is something distinctive to the only barely harnessed,
seemingly pointless physicality that appears quite young in
some boys, such as might be captured by lines written
about my son at four or five:
What is it about a slatted wall
That makes you run full-tilt, quick climb,
Jump down and wander away until
Another obstacle catches your eye?
Such behavior might be indicative of a preference for what
psychologists call kinesthetic, as opposed to auditory or
visual, memory, a preference for learning by doing.
There is no obvious reason that the relationship
between physicality and cognition in some boys should
persist into late adolescence. And it would be a serious
mistake not to italicize "some." Other boys are quite at
home with other forms of learning, and so with degrees of
abstraction. Clearly, there is a continuum here. A notable
intermediate point is occupied by those boys who are more
comfortable with school projects that require doing in a
more metaphorical sense, not repairing a car but making an
argument or producing an industry analysis. An amusing
example of this continuum is implied by varying degrees
[Vol. 531046
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with which successful male academics of a certain age were
willing/able to switch from handwriting and secretarial
assistance to keyboarding alone. For some, myself included,
handwriting was just so much easier and so the shift was
postponed as long as possible. Still, there is reason to
believe that a preference for physically-based cognition does
persist, that for a large percentage of boys who "like to work
with their hands," such a way of learning is somehow
easier.
It would be a mistake to infer a lack of cognitive skills
on the part of boys for whom this preference persists. As
Mike Rose shows in his wonderful book, The Mind at Work,
whether the job be that of a carpenter, electrician,
hairdresser, plumber, waitress, or welder, significant
cognitive skills are essential to the work and an aesthetic
sense as well. These cognitive skills are rooted in
physicality, in doing. They are Deweyite skills, Montessori
even, not the skills of rote memory and abstraction-
mathematical, literary, or rhetorical-that are the center-
piece of higher education. This tie of cognition to physical
activity may be the foundation of the skills that inspired
the late-Nineteenth Century schools of engineering and
agriculture, but even there that tie has been lost.
Indeed, to make an inference of cognitive deficiency
from a preference for learning by doing would be to repeat a
mistake that made for the deadening effect of Taylorite,
mass production, industrial labor. Having assumed that the
hordes of immigrants entering industry at the end of the
Nineteenth Century were stupid because they were poor
and could not speak English, and worse, fearing that
whenever such folk spoke together in their unintelligibly
foreign tongue they were plotting against their betters, a
system of manufacturing was developed for the quintessen-
tially stupid human: tighten this bolt and this bolt only,
over and over. None of this routine tapped into physically
centered cognitive intelligence. Not surprisingly, individu-
als with such an intellectual base experienced their work as
alienating. They still do. 4
The preference of some boys for cognition rooted in
physicality fits poorly with the content of higher education
4. Was it not the managers who were stupid, given their inability to learn a
foreign language even rudimentarily as their employees were able to do?
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today, based as it is on listening to, and reading about, a
broad range of theory and the doing of nothing more than
an occasional problem set or lab assignment. And so its lack
of appeal to such individuals is easily understood. However,
it would be a mistake to believe that the content of college
education has been designed with the intent to exclude
these boys.
Though such exclusion is implicit in college education
in America as early as the Seventeenth Century, the
exclusion was not significant before the great expansion of
education in the Sixties and Seventies. In these years post-
secondary education was cheap. A gamble on its value,
especially a small gamble on the value of what is now
known as an associate's degree, might have seemed to have
been worth it. However, today, the continuing shift away
from state financing of such education to tuition-driven,
debt-financed education surely has altered that seeming
value. So, rather than intending to exclude, higher
education simply has not acted to include those boys whose
cognition is strongly based in physicality, unfortunately at
a time when the alternative of working in industrial
manufacturing has become an increasingly implausible
alternative. Perhaps it is too much to suggest that institu-
tions of higher education should strive to do otherwise;
perhaps not.
While some might assume that a cognitive preference
for physically based learning would be closely related to
social class, it is important to remember that even at the
turn of the century, the more academic parts of college were
not particularly attractive to male students of the upper
and upper-middle classes. Some of course loved it. They
became teachers of one kind or another or, after the office
closed, dinner was served, and the kids were put to bed,
filled the evening hours with serious reading. For the rest,
magazines, hobbies, and community activities filled the
hours before bed. Before graduation, it seems that similar
distractions filled the hours not absolutely necessary for
study and not occupied by the kind of bullshitting with the
guys that marriage and a family generally ended. So, the
problem that I first perceived among boarders in the
Northwest and that Lois Weis identified in the male
children of the unionized middle class is not new. It is just
worse than ever. For some reason, the arts and sciences
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core of a college education has not fit many American males
for a long time.
5
And why should it? It is important to remember that
academics are a really strange breed, a breed apart. The
bookstores are full of books. Readers abound in our society.
But academics disdain most available books. They are trade
books, we say, not real books. For almost all people but us,
writing is a utilitarian matter, at least if writing for tenure
is not seen as a utilitarian venture. Ours is a hierarchy
where teaching is a second-class activity, though increas-
ingly, pleasing students is an obligation of tenure and
maybe some day-God forbid!-a condition of continuing
appointment thereafter. We tell the students what we
believe that they should know about a world that we know
of mostly by rumor or mathematics. We thus offer a cultural
education that is most closely tied to a culture that our
students are quite unlikely to experience, while we are
disdainful of the culture that they are most likely to
experience. We academics do purport to decode mass
culture for the benefit of our students. Still, while that
culture is not transparent and may need decoding, helping
people understand the culture they live in is not the same
thing as our efforts in critiquing, much less deconstructing,
it.
And yet, in support of the academic enterprise, it needs
be recognized that the diffident attitude of some late
adolescent upper-, upper-middle- and now middle-class
males toward education, that seems to have been a constant
for a long time, also extends across varying academic
aspirations. A wise-ass t-shirt that my son has reads, "I'm
like a superhero with no powers or motivation," this from a
person newly entered into a Ph.D. program in an abstruse
field, music history, where he knows he will find out that
few, if any, of his teachers care much about opening up the
vast world of American music-classical, jazz, pop, and
what have you-to college students, his passion. The
5. Undergraduate faculty who question this observation ought to pay
attention to the selection bias in their experience. The students referred to do
not attend office hours or come up to ask questions after class. They do not turn
up in seminars, unless forced to do so by distribution requirements. And when
they choose to attend, they sit sullenly surfing the net on their laptops in the




ambivalence here is overwhelming. How could it be
otherwise in undertaking an endeavor where he will have to
show proficiency in a foreign language, even though his
interest is not about music written by people who speak a
foreign language (after all we are a cultural hegemon) on
the off chance that some European scholar will know
enough about this country's culture to have something
interesting to say about its music.
So, if an academic brat could be this ambivalent about
higher education-and in his ambivalence my son is
anything but alone among such brats-seeking the training
necessary for employment but dubious of this or any other
vocation, any commitment to be his work, then what can
Lois Weis' children of the industrial middle-class make of
the whole enterprise? As they might see it, higher education
has been designed for an unimaginably other social class,
filled with students whose very existence, whose choice to
ape the working-class world of jeans, t-shirts, and rumpled
overshirts with expensive substitutes for the real thing
while engaging in sports opportunities that come with fifty
dollar lift tickets, and eight hundred dollar boots or multi-
thousand dollar powerboats, screams, "These are not my
people and I can't possibly catch up, even if I want to." And
by offering a curriculum that, on the one hand is unrelated
to any work as such students know or can imagine, and on
the other trains for jobs that are neither intrinsically
interesting to boys-remember that the boy jobs of
childhood are policeman, fireman, heavy equipment driver,
and garbage man; not salesman or middle-management,
cubicle warrior-nor well-paying enough to allow uninterest
to be overwhelmed, higher education can hardly be a
welcome beacon.
Add to the social distance derived from class, the
impediments to college attendance that are more narrowly
economic and the resulting combination is singularly
unattractive. Post-secondary education can be found for
someone whose cognition is largely physically based.
Schools specializing in the fine and applied arts and crafts
are obvious examples, but there are also programs that
emphasize "doing" in a more metaphorical sense-making
arguments, preparing reports, writing advertising or other
media copy, engaging in outdoor education. However, such
schools are not cheap and vaguely middle-class jobs follow
only for those who do very well, and often not even for
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them. There is also the possibility of succumbing to
parental pressure and struggling to finish near the bottom
of a college class while enrolled in a program in
communication or criminal justice or travel and leisure.
Still, it takes a good deal of parental indulgence and
significant parental financial resources to undertake either
route through higher education. Take away the financial
support of the kind that parents routinely provide for
children of the upper-middle class and these alternatives
become as implausible, as less-fancy alternatives seem to
have been for the larger portion of Weis' boys. Indeed, the
amazing thing about her data is that any of her male
interviewees earned even an associate's degree.
Next, set aside cognitive preferences and the intrinsic
interest of higher education, as well as their ugly
interaction with parental economic resources, and instead
consider one of the social roles common to late adolescents.
Weis' young men and my boarders might be called
"slackers." Though some people who use that word see it as
meaning "lazy," the common epithet, "lazy slacker,"
suggests that lazy may be only half of it. Slacker denotes
someone who is not working up to potential but not
necessarily someone who is not working. Slacker also
denotes a male human.6 Slacker is also a term of approba-
tion. In some circles it is an achievement to do well enough
to more than get by without much effort, even an art form
that, like Bartleby's famous, "I would prefer not," proclaims
both ability and choice. The slacker could do better, but
does not wish to.
Consider the three guys in the record shop in the movie
High Fidelity. All three-Rob, Dick, and Barry-could be
said to be getting by at less than their potential, harboring
dreams that they were doing little to move forward, but no
one could say that they didn't know anything. Granted,
their knowledge was lightweight and inconsequential, but
that knowledge cannot be said to have come from anything
but long, probably hard, study. It is not so much that these
individuals had taken to heart Timothy Leary's mantra,
6. How obvious is this? Well, women get better grades in high school,
college, and law school. However, they do slightly poorer on their SATs and
LSATs. A plausible lesson from this fact is that when it is crunch time, the boys
work. Having placed well, they slack off, as is evidenced by their taking longer
to complete a degree program.
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"Turn on, tune in, and drop out," though, of course, I
suspect there was some of that, rather that they had
occupied themselves- in ways that seemed to ignore the
implicit parental demand, "Make something of yourself,"
They were comfortable with the modest income that their
knowledge made possible: selling shards of culture to
similarly marginal individuals who themselves earned a
modest living by trading on their own, different, but equally
arcane, knowledge.
It is far too easy to say that all three are boys, lost boys,
who like Peter Pan refuse to grow up. Such a diagnosis only
poses the question about what it is to be a man. Each was
anything but a grownup, as such is conventionally defined.
But, in no sense did any of them wish to contest what it was
to be a man in their culture. Each had found a place on the
road to manhood and stopped. And so the question can
better be restated, "Why stop?" Why choose to more than
get by, but not to achieve that middle-class, white-collar
success that college education promises to deliver?
Here, one might turn to the discourse of alienation.
After "Dilbert" and Office Space no one can possibly deny
that the cubicle existence that faces many graduates of
higher education can be grotesquely dehumanizing. And the
jobs of many professionals-lawyers, doctors, even
veterinarians-are only better because of the size of the
paycheck; for some-teachers and nurses come to mind-
there is not even that reward. But, I shall avoid the
contemporary discourse of alienation. First, others have
gone there before, most recently my colleague, Bert
Westbrook, and like he, have done far better with that topic
than I could ever do. And second, outside of the narrow
Marxist definition of alienation, the concept turns too much
on the image of the jolly blacksmith, the hearty baker, and
the diligent cobbler in some mythic time past, an image
that I have a hard time taking seriously. Labor may always
have been alienating for some large portion of the
population, even those engaged in subsistence farming,
though specific experiences of it probably differ according to
conditions at a given time and place.
At the same time, one cannot lay all of the blame on the
colleges without asking more directly about the students
who might have done better, but chose otherwise, the
classic slackers. Understanding such behavior is not easy,
but one aspect of the matter seems to be this. For whatever
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reason, late- and post-adolescent males seem to have a very
long time horizon. For them, the future is deferrable, and
deferral seems easy. White-collar jobs, while hardly
attractive, are really quite numerous; if one is passed on,
another will soon appear. And light-lifting jobs-retail sales
or restaurants or warehouses-are even more numerous,
though lower paying. But even these lower paying jobs
provide enough income for someone of modest tastes and
desires to defer the future for quite a while, and instead,
enjoy the present.
Such deferral is deep in our culture. Angie's question,
"What are you going to do tonight, Marty?" and the
butcher's answer, "Oh, I don't know. What are you going to
do?" is a working-class litany from the Fifties, not a slacker
dialog from the Nineties, though it easily could have been.
About twenty years later, it is Tony Manero, a paint store
employee in Brooklyn's Bay Ridge neighborhood, whose life
parallels Marty's. And twenty years after that, comes Will
Hunting working as a janitor in a math department that he
could intellectually dominate.
Again, I must insist; deferral should not be confused
with perpetual Peter Pan-"I won't grow up!" Peter
expressed a certain excitement and joy in his play, an
inventiveness too, in his games. Today's slacker, as well as
the Marty or Tony or Rob, Dick, and Barry from varying
times before, seem to be anything but joyful. Activities
pursued during or after work seem to be dogged, resigned
ways of filling time that is being marked, an adulthood that
is being deferred.
Curiously, the long horizon that deferral implies is in
some tension with the games that today's boys play, or may
eventually play, or always watch. Theirs is a world of win or
lose, right now, today! At most there is a long season,
implying another chance to recover from a loss. Basketball
at twenty, softball at thirty, tennis at forty, golf at fifty,
bocce at sixty, all are exercises in competitive outcomes
today, followed with camaraderie among the players at a
local dive, a sports bar, in the shade, at the club, on a
bench. The pattern of more distanced spectator activity-
baseball in summer, football in fall, basketball in winter,
and NASCAR all year-round-is much the same. This
American version of adult memories of "the playing fields of
Eton" suggests a rhythmic echo to my young son's bursts of
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energy-the intensity of the game and the horizon of a
rather short season.
Clean wins and losses, even over a long season, are not
what higher education offers. Its rhythm is more like that of
the swimmer or biker or skier or runner, for whom there
may be a local race season, but no real match-ups. These
are not the sports of American boys. True, in education
there may be cumulative winners, but the season is
interminably long: twelve years, then four for college,
followed by two for an M.B.A., three for a J.D., four for an
M.D. plus endless years of further training, or five or six for
a Ph.D. plus who knows how many years before tenure is
acquired. And then what is the season for a job in the
Impatient Economy, a world where there are damn few
clean wins, but many possible messy losses, as one's resume
lengthens with experience gained? It is not hard to see that
a dislike for the terms of both games, a distaste for their
separate enterprises, could combine at any point to slide
into extended deferral. 7
"Deferred for what?" is, of course, the question. Well, in
prototypically male culture for three things, I suppose:
Marriage, kids, and a real job, one that provides a bit of
dignity. The first two were what Marty was marking time
for; after all, the movie known by his name is really a love
story. The end of his deferral was a woman, Clara, someone
important enough to demand that it stop. For Tony,
dancing, both as an activity and a metaphor, on Saturday
night led to a girl, Stephanie, and then to the recognition
that life with the guys was going nowhere and so to
physical escape across the East River to Manhattan.8 Will
followed Skylar to the West coast in a beat up car. Rob went
back to Laura in an actual and metaphorical downpour and
Dick found Annaugh, as awkward a soul as he, at the sales
counter. It is all very predictable, except for Barry's
blossoming as a white boy covering an old Motown hit. The
7. Bert Westbrook, more of an athlete than I ever was, or will be, suggested
the observations in this and the previous paragraph.
8. It is important to note that in the years between Marty and Saturday
Night Fever it takes a night on the town in which sex turns into a surprisingly
graphic rape and high jinks turns into a fatal accident/suicide from the
Verrazano-Narrows Bridge, to get Tony to recognize that the time for deferral
has past. For Marty, all it took was the prospect of another empty night with
his buddies in the neighborhood watering hole.
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story of Troy and Lelania in Reality Bites is only a modest
variation on this plot structure, appropriate to two college
graduates. This time it is Lelania who finds that life as the
assistant to a television personality sucks and so is drawn
to her housemate Troy, each finding solace in the other,
escaping from a world that is alien to the dreams spawned
by their differing academic adventures. 9
Despite the marriage and kids that the love story form
implies in the forever after, today there is a real problem
with the intersection of these two deferrals and the third-
the dignity that a real job provides. One needs to remember
that, as one of my male students determinedly brought to
my attention, in a very real sense, men aren't really good
for much of anything, at least as a white middle-class
variety of male culture could well see it. Find a mate, father
children like the male lion that, the zoologists say,
copulates a lot to make up for low sperm count, and the job
is done. In a two-wage-earner family, it is easy, however
wrong-headed, to see working to support those children as a
role that is not particularly important. Someone else could
do it.
The sense that someone else could do it is reinforced by
the jobs that the Impatient Economy serves up these days.
For work to be meaningful, it would seem that it needs to
be imbued with a certain dignity. The lovely lady who
cleans my teeth articulated this need when, near the end of
a long day, she commented, "I really do not know why I still
do this job, but I tell myself that I help keep people's teeth
healthy and in their head." In the Nineteenth and early-
early-Twentieth Centuries wonderful art celebrated the
dignity of work. Most of this art focused on growing or
making things, the activities of agricultural or industrial
economies. Making an engine, even repairing or tuning one,
has a certain dignity; stocking shelves in an auto parts
store or working the checkout counter is something else.
9. All of these stories are as told by the male protagonist, as implicitly is my
wedding story. Laura urged that there is a suppressed question here. The
popular feminist culture slogan captures that question when observing, "A
woman needs a man, like a fish needs a bicycle." Just why would these young
women put up with these young men? The answer is not obvious, though it is at
least possible that they are close enough to the available norm that such is the
best that can be done within the social/biological imperative implied by these
womens' search. Beyond this crude hypothesis is a project for someone else.
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Sewing garments is a much different, more dignified
occupation than folding them just right in order to make an
attractive display at The Gap. And what of managing the
people who process credit card payments or even write
advertising copy, as did Tom Rath, The Man in the Gray
Flannel Suit. Lots of jobs in the Impatient Economy, surely
a majority, are significantly impaired, dignity-wise and yet
a dumbfoundingly large amount that provide a decent
income require at least part of a college education.
At this juncture it must again be remembered that
higher education is not intrinsically interesting to most
humans. One needs some reason to survive its dreariness.
Professional jobs provide that something, or at least its
illusion-the dignity that is associated with the idea of
helping someone, originally by providing comfort during the
vicissitudes of life, latterly in ameliorating the unpleasant-
nesses that make up life in a bureaucratic universe or in a
changing body. If acquiring such dignity is not a plausible
endpoint of an education, why start it? Once started, why
complete it? Once completed, why not measure life by the
recreational pursuits that accompany the monetary
rewards education makes possible? Life's a bitch; vamonos
a la playa!
And so in a real sense, my young groom and his friends
and the larger part of Weis' children of the white lower-
middle/upper-working class, respond in pretty much the
same way to the education served up as part of the
contemporary Impatient Economy. If college is acceptably
easy to undertake, if being a slacker is a plausible version
of coolness, then do it, but don't take the education very
seriously as anything other than a means to awesome snow
or a bodacious boat. If college is not accessible, well then,
hang out with your buds, toss back a few beers, maybe
ingest the locally fashionable illegal substances, race some
cars, and dream of being the modern version of the
cowboy-the interstate trucker, a job that is mostly long
hours on a tight schedule eating bad food, but at least has
the dignity of getting stuff to people on time, just as being
on the trail once had the dignity of getting the cows to
market. After all, only men have the luxury of long
deferrals and so of being romantics about the future.
Raising kids alone, as lionesses do, is just hard work, that
and long hours and the occasional, always dog-tired feeling
of a job well done.
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What then is one to conclude about boys and higher
education? My studied use of, and so implicit contrast
between, "boys" and "young men" hopefully suggests that it
would be wrong both to, and not to, identify boys with a
particular type of cognition, seen as somehow limiting
formal educational potential, just as it would be wrong both
to, and not to, identify "young men" with the settled-out
middle-class existence that follows from completion of some
form of post-secondary education. College is both a barrier
to be surmounted before the attainment of an at least
middle-class existence and the entr6e into a less than
wholly attractive working life. In the words of the movie
title, this reality bites. And so, those individuals with a
socially "male" perspective on the world find that endless
deferral, remaining a "boy" by identifying themselves not
with their job, but with their leisure-time activities, is
preferable to becoming a "young man."
At least in movie fantasy, it is marriage and a family
that forces making the decision avoided by the choice of
deferral-getting a "real" job and so "growing up." What
really occasions this transition from boy to young man
probably mirrors the movie fantasy, but also encompasses
numerous other things. However, both the shape of the
Impatient Economy and the nature of college education are
impediments to making any such a transition. Perhaps
similar impediments have always been in place. I wouldn't
know, having gone straight from law school into marriage
and soon thereafter into a real job, though it took a while to
gather the courage to have any kids. But my choice was
made in another country: and besides that economy is dead.
In the different country that America has become over the
past forty years, only a fool would believe that changing
either the economy or higher education would be an easy




Six books were helpful in writing this piece: THOMAS
HINE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN TEENAGER
(1999); JOSEPH F. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN
AMERICA 1970 TO THE PRESENT (1977); GRACE PALLADINO,
TEENAGERS: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (1996); MIKE ROSE, THE
MIND AT WORK: VALUING THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE
AMERICAN WORKER (2004); CHRISTINE HOFF SOMMERS, THE
WAR AGAINST BOYS (2000); and LOIS WEIS, CLASS REUNION
(2004). Those interested in my understanding of the
American Economy in the Twentieth Century will need to
wait for the publication of Law and Economic Change in the
Short Twentieth Century, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
LAW IN AMERICA (C. Tomlins & M. Grossberg eds.,
forthcoming 2006). The movies referred to are ANIMAL
HOUSE (Universal Pictures 1978); GOOD WILL HUNTING
(Miramax Films 1997); HIGH FIDELITY (Touchstone Pictures
2000); THE MAN IN THE GRAY FLANNEL SUIT (Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. 1956); MARTY (Hecht-Lancaster
Productions 1955); OFFICE SPACE (Twentieth Century Fox
Home Entertainment 1999); REALITY BITES (Universal
Studios, Inc. 1994); and SATURDAY NIGHT FEVER
(Paramount Pictures 1977). Scott Adams' Dilbert is a comic
strip, available at http://www.dilbert.com. Extra Credit will
be given for finding the unacknowledged, mangled
quotation from CHRISTOPHER MARLOW, THE JEW OF MALTA
(1592).
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